Sargisson, Contemporary Feminist Utopianism (i) (1996)

Introduction & Part 1 (Chapters 1 & 2)

Sargisson sets out her discussion by explaining that she is using 'utopianism' following Sargent (1994), Levitas (1990), and Bloch (1986) , as an umbrella term to refer to social dreaming, a desire for a better way of being, or as an impulse. She first sets out to challenge the notion of utopia=perfection, arguing that a survey of texts suggests no such conclusion. She explains that the central argument of the book is about critiquing perfection as equalling closure and sees in utopianism being wrapped up in the question of how meaning is constructed (3). In other words, I think she is arguing that in debates over utopia, what is also being contested are more theoretical desires to make meaning closed, to settle the meaning of a concept, idea, etc.

In the first chapter, Sargisson critiques form-based and content-based approaches to utopianism. Drawing on the work of Bloch and Levitas, Sargisson argues that form-based approaches are too limiting, as utopianism is expressed in many forms. She points to the disciplinary desires inherent in these form-based definitions, as well as cultural imperialism. Moving on to thinking about utopianism through content definitions, Sargisson similarly expresses unease about the limitations of such an approach. One of her continual arguments is that 'A restrictive and narrow approach to utopianism produces a restricted (restrictive) and narrow definition, understanding or concept. The act(ivity) of conceptualization thereby becomes an exclusionary one' (19). Like many other theorists she is keen to expand the notion of utopianism as perfection and sees this understanding as common in content-based approaches. Turning to feminist utopias, she argues that if the working definition of utopianism is perfection, then 'many feminist utopias do not "fit" into a definition which relies on finality of end' (20). She thus uses feminist utopias to push for an expansion of the definition. However, she also traces back through historical utopias, such as More's Utopia, to argue that a characteristic of utopia is their engagement with contemporary debates. This characteristic Sargisson argues, results not in a closed text, 'but rather one that struggles to maintain an open end (or mind) by inhabiting the spaces and tensions between two ideals' (27). Sargisson thus argues that utopianism has always been more than a blueprint for a perfect future through connecting utopian texts to the contradictions and politics of their contemporary times. Utopias 'have a critical edge in that they challenge the political present' (28).

Sargisson then turns to feminist utopias to argue for the limitations of focusing on how the content of these utopias somehow makes them different from the male/mainstream texts. She argues that attempts to define feminist utopias such as Pearson's (1981) and Gearhart's (1984) potentially lead to notions of feminist utopias as having a binary relationship to the present, as mere reversals of the status quo. Further, she pushes to suggest that such definitions have the effect of homogenizing and defining feminism itself. Again, her main concern is with how these definitions close off understandings of feminism and utopianism.

In the second chapter, Sargisson focuses on function-based approaches to utopianism and judges these approaches as superior to the previous two. She argues that theorists that focus on the function of utopia tend to suggest that it is 'transformative, subversive or oppositional, or to have some other radical or political function' (47). Sargisson takes issue however with the definition of 'opposition' in these accounts. Looking at Mannheim (1936), she argues for the too simplistic dualism assumed between ideology and utopia. For Mannheim (1936) the ideological is what retains order, while the utopic destroys that order. Sargisson refutes this notion of utopia mostly due to the requirement that it must achieve change, which Sargisson suggests brings utopia too close to revolution. Sargisson argues that while utopia 'depends on and results from dissatisfaction with the present,' it does not 'comprise a coherent body in dialectical opposition with the dominant ideology' (49). From these socialist oppositional approaches to utopianism, Sargisson moves to consider a feminist oppositional model which she alligns herself with and defines as such: 'The function of utopianism, thus approached, is not to blueprint and enclose the future but to explore alternative states of being to those presently existing - to stretch and expand our understanding of the possible, thus making a multiplicity of radically different futures not only desirable but also conceivable' (52). As for the 'time' of utopia, Sargisson argues that utopianism is about anticipating 'different "nows"' (52) and thus operates in the political present and works as 'a paradigm shift in consciousness' (52). In other words, utopianism is moved from a 'speculative (or concrete) future to a no place/good place that is an alternative reading of the present' (52). In this conceptualization, utopianism sounds more like a mode of possibility...

Sargisson then turns to Moylan and 'critical utopias.' Unlike Mannheim, Moylan allows for a multiplicity of opposition (his conception of the historic bloc). Further, he also stresses process and even critiques the concept of opposition as dialectical to ideology. 'Critical opposition is not the classical binary tradition but opposes the existing space of opposition; its funciton is not to provide an alternative but to deny that existing options are the only ones' (55). However, she is concerned with his tentative suggestion of a unity between oppositional forces but she does like how he attempts to explain precisely why utopias do not seem to be about perfection after all.

She therefore privileges function as an approach to utopianism and will go on to argue for utopianism as a place to think feminist political theory. She ends the chapter by using utopianism as a means to creating a new space to conceptualize past, present, future. Sargisson thus stresses 'the paradigmatic nature of the transformative effect of utopian thought: if utopian thought can change the shape and scope of our consciousness then the unthinkable can be thought and desired' (59).